CEO Ownership and Stock Market Performance, and Managerial Discretion
102 Pages
Posted: 16 Feb 2009
Last revised: 8 May 2013
Luxembourg School of Finance
University of Mannheim - Department of International Finance
Date Written: May 1, 2013
Abstract
We examine the relationship between CEO ownership and stock market performance. A strategy based on public information about managerial ownership delivers annual abnormal returns of 4 to 10%. The effect is strongest among firms with weak external governance, weak product market competition, and large managerial discretion. This suggests that CEO ownership can reverse the negative impact of weak governance. Furthermore, owner CEOs are value increasing: they reduce empire building and run their firms more efficiently. Overall, our findings indicate that the market does not correctly price the incentive effects of managerial ownership, suggesting interesting feedback effects between corporate finance and asset pricing.
Keywords: Managerial Ownership, Asset Pricing with Large Shareholders, Managerial Discretion
JEL Classification: G12, G30
Suggested Citation:
Suggested Citation
Lilienfeld-Toal, Ulf von and Ruenzi, Stefan, CEO Ownership and Stock Market Performance, and Managerial Discretion (May 1, 2013). Journal of Finance, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1343179 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1343179
