Towards an Efficient Mechanism for Prescription Drug Procurement

37 Pages Posted: 17 Feb 2009 Last revised: 21 Mar 2021

See all articles by Kyna Fong

Kyna Fong

University of California, Berkeley

Michael Schwarz

Yahoo! - Yahoo! Research Labs; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: February 2009

Abstract

This paper applies ideas from mechanism design to model procurement of prescription drugs. We present a mechanism for government-funded market-driven drug procurement that achieves very close to full static efficiency -- all members have access to all but at most a single drug -- without distorting incentives for innovation.

Suggested Citation

Fong, Kyna and Schwarz, Michael, Towards an Efficient Mechanism for Prescription Drug Procurement (February 2009). NBER Working Paper No. w14718, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1344699

Kyna Fong

University of California, Berkeley ( email )

310 Barrows Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

Michael Schwarz (Contact Author)

Yahoo! - Yahoo! Research Labs ( email )

Sunnyvale, CA 94089

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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