Comparing Policies to Combat Emissions Leakage: Border Carbon Adjustments versus Rebates

41 Pages Posted: 21 Feb 2009 Last revised: 25 May 2014

See all articles by Carolyn Fischer

Carolyn Fischer

Resources for the Future; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; University of Ottawa - Department of Economics

Alan K. Fox

U.S. International Trade Commission

Date Written: March 9, 2011

Abstract

We explore conditions determining which anti-leakage policies might be more effective complements to regulation of domestic greenhouse gas emissions. We consider four policies that could be combined with unilateral emissions pricing to counter effects on international competitiveness: a border charge on imports, a border rebate for exports, full border adjustment, and domestic output-based rebating. Each option faces different potential legal hurdles in international trade law; each also has different economic impacts. While all can support competitiveness, none is necessarily effective at reducing global emissions. Nor is it possible to rank the options; effectiveness depends on the relative emissions rates, elasticities of substitution, and consumption volumes. We illustrate these results with simulations for the energy-intensive sectors of three different economies- the United States, Canada, and Europe. Although most controversial, full border adjustment is usually most effective, but output-based rebating for key manufacturing sectors can achieve many of the gains.

Keywords: environmental tax, rebate, border tax adjustment, emissions leakage, climate

JEL Classification: Q2, Q43, H2, D61

Suggested Citation

Fischer, Carolyn and Fischer, Carolyn and Fox, Alan K., Comparing Policies to Combat Emissions Leakage: Border Carbon Adjustments versus Rebates (March 9, 2011). RFF Discussion Paper No. 09-02-REV, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1345928 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1345928

Carolyn Fischer (Contact Author)

Resources for the Future ( email )

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Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://https://research.vu.nl/en/persons/carolyn-fischer

University of Ottawa - Department of Economics ( email )

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Alan K. Fox

U.S. International Trade Commission ( email )

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Washington, DC 20436
United States
202-205-3267 (Phone)
202-205-2340 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.usitc.gov

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