White-Collar Plea Bargaining and Sentencing after Booker

Bibas, Stephanos

White-Collar Plea Bargaining and Sentencing after Booker

William and Mary Law Review, Vol. 47, p. 721, 2005

U of Penn Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 09-03

22 Pages Posted: 19 Feb 2009 Last revised: 12 May 2009

See all articles by Stephanos Bibas

Stephanos Bibas

University of Pennsylvania Law School

Date Written: 2005

Abstract

This symposium essay speculates about how Booker's loosening of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is likely to affect white-collar plea bargaining and sentencing. Prosecutors' punishment intuitions and the strong white-collar defense bar will keep white-collar sentencing from growing as harsh as drug sentencing, but the parallels are nonetheless ominous. The essay suggests that the Sentencing Commission revise its loss-computation rules, calibrate white-collar sentences to their core purpose of expressing condemnation, and adding shaming punishments and apologies to give moderate prison sentences more bite.

Keywords: Criminal sentences, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, white collar crime, plea bargaining, Apprendi, Blakely, Booker, Sarbanes-Oxley

JEL Classification: K14, K42

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Bibas, Stephanos, White-Collar Plea Bargaining and Sentencing after Booker (2005). William and Mary Law Review, Vol. 47, p. 721, 2005; U of Penn Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 09-03. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1346390