Incentives and the Structure of Teams

29 Pages Posted: 28 Feb 2009

See all articles by April Franco

April Franco

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management; University of Toronto at Scarborough - Division of Management

Matthew F. Mitchell

Rotman School of Management

Galina M. Vereshchagina

Arizona State University (ASU) - Economics Department; University of Iowa

Date Written: February 27, 2009

Abstract

This paper endogenizes the matching structure of teams in a simple environment with moral hazard. We show that team incentive problems may, on their own, generate monotone matching predictions in the absence of complementarities or anti-complementarities in production technology. We also derive sufficient conditions on the primitives of the model leading to the optimality of positive and negative matching of team members.

Keywords: Moral hazard, teams, complementarity

JEL Classification: L23; L20

Suggested Citation

Franco, April and Mitchell, Matthew F. and Vereshchagina, Galina M., Incentives and the Structure of Teams (February 27, 2009). Atlanta Competitive Advantage Conference Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1350540 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1350540

April Franco (Contact Author)

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management ( email )

105 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3E6 M5S1S4
Canada

University of Toronto at Scarborough - Division of Management ( email )

1265 Military Trial
Scarborough, Ontario M1C 1A4
Canada

Matthew F. Mitchell

Rotman School of Management ( email )

Toronto, Ontario M5S 3E6
Canada

Galina M. Vereshchagina

Arizona State University (ASU) - Economics Department ( email )

Tempe, AZ 85287-3806
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.raspopov.net/GALA/

University of Iowa ( email )

Acquisitions
5020 Main Library
Iowa City, IA 52242-1000
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/faculty/results.cfm?id=2187

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