Terrorism in the Worlds of Welfare Capitalism

CIE Working Paper No. 2009-04

37 Pages Posted: 3 Mar 2009

See all articles by Tim Krieger

Tim Krieger

University of Freiburg - Department of Economics

Daniel Meierrieks

WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Date Written: March 2, 2009

Abstract

This contribution investigates the link between welfare policies and domestic terrorism for 15 Western European countries during 1984-2003. We argue that welfare policies improve national social and socio-economic conditions and thus increase the opportunity costs of terrorism. We investigate whether spending in certain policy fields translates into a reduction of terrorism, and whether certain worlds of welfare capitalism [Esping-Andersen (1990)] are more resistant to the threat of domestic terrorism. We find strong support that higher spending in certain policy fields is associated with a significant reduction in domestic terrorist activity. Only moderate evidence indicates that the different worlds of welfare capitalism are differently prepared to deal with domestic terrorism. Spending - or the mere existence of a social system - seems to be more strongly associated with a reduction in domestic terrorism than the actual welfare systems' institutional design. Our findings are robust to a variety of specifications.

Keywords: Domestic Terrorism, Social Policy, Welfare Regimes, Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Western Europe, Paradox of Redistribution, Beveridge vs. Bismarck

JEL Classification: D74, H5

Suggested Citation

Krieger, Tim and Meierrieks, Daniel, Terrorism in the Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (March 2, 2009). CIE Working Paper No. 2009-04, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1351765 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1351765

Tim Krieger (Contact Author)

University of Freiburg - Department of Economics ( email )

University of Freiburg
Wilhelmstr. 1b
Freiburg, D-79085
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.wguth.uni-freiburg.de

Daniel Meierrieks

WZB Berlin Social Science Center ( email )

Reichpietschufer 50
D-10785 Berlin, 10785
Germany

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