Do Pension-Related Business Ties Influence Mutual Fund Proxy Voting? Evidence from Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation

40 Pages Posted: 3 Mar 2009 Last revised: 26 Oct 2015

See all articles by Rasha Ashraf

Rasha Ashraf

Georgia State University - Department of Finance

Narayanan Jayaraman

Georgia Institute of Technology - Scheller College of Business

Harley E. Ryan

Georgia State University - Department of Finance

Date Written: November 23, 2010

Abstract

We examine the relation between mutual fund votes on shareholder executive compensation proposals and pension-related business ties between fund families and the firms. In unconditional tests, we find that fund families support management when they have pension ties to the firm. We find no relation when we stratify by fund family in conditional tests, which suggests that fund families with pension ties vote with management at both client and non-client firms. We confirm this result in an analysis of non-client firms. Overall, our results suggest that pension related business ties influence fund families to vote with management at all firms.

Keywords: Proxy Voting, Mutual Funds, Executive Compensation, Shareholder Rights

JEL Classification: G30, G23

Suggested Citation

Ashraf, Rasha and Jayaraman, Narayanan and Ryan, Harley E., Do Pension-Related Business Ties Influence Mutual Fund Proxy Voting? Evidence from Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation (November 23, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1351966 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1351966

Rasha Ashraf

Georgia State University - Department of Finance ( email )

35 Broad Street
Suite 1238
Atlanta, GA 30303
United States
404-413-7348 (Phone)
404-894-6030 (Fax)

Narayanan Jayaraman

Georgia Institute of Technology - Scheller College of Business ( email )

800 West Peachtree St.
Atlanta, GA 30308
United States
404-894-4389 (Phone)
404-894-6030 (Fax)

Harley E. Ryan (Contact Author)

Georgia State University - Department of Finance ( email )

University Plaza
35 Broad Street, Suite 1221
Atlanta, GA 30303-3083
United States
404-651-2674 (Phone)
404-651-2630 (Fax)

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
421
Abstract Views
2,333
rank
75,506
PlumX Metrics