41 Pages Posted: 5 Mar 2009
Date Written: March 2009
We describe factors that make bidding in large spectrum auctions complex -- including exposure and budget problems, the role of timing within an ascending auction, and the possibilities for price forecasting -- and how economic and game-theoretic analysis can assist bidders in overcoming these problems. We illustrate with the case of the FCC's Advanced Wireless Service auction, in which a new entrant, SpectrumCo, faced all these problems yet managed to purchase nationwide coverage at a discount of roughly a third relative to the prices paid by its incumbent competitors in the same auction, saving more than a billion dollars.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Bulow, Jeremy and Levin, Jonathan and Milgrom, Paul R., Winning Play in Spectrum Auctions (March 2009). NBER Working Paper No. w14765. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1352946