Corporate Hedging and Shareholder Value

Journal of Financial Research, Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 317-371, Winter 2010

WBS Finance Group Research Paper No. 116

60 Pages Posted: 6 Mar 2009 Last revised: 23 Dec 2019

See all articles by Kevin Aretz

Kevin Aretz

Alliance Manchester Business School

Söhnke M. Bartram

Warwick Business School - Department of Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: March 5, 2009

Abstract

According to financial theory, corporate hedging can increase shareholder value in the presence of capital market imperfections such as direct and indirect costs of financial distress, costly external financing, and taxes. This paper presents a comprehensive review of the extensive existing empirical literature that has tested these theories, documenting overall mixed empirical support for rationales of hedging with derivatives at the firm level. While various empirical challenges and limitations advise some caution with regard to the interpretation of the existing evidence, the results are, however, consistent with derivatives use being just one part of a broader financial strategy that considers the type and level of financial risks, the availability of risk-management tools, and the operating environment of the firm. In particular, recent evidence suggests that derivatives use is related to debt levels and maturity, dividend policy, holdings of liquid assets, and the degree of operating hedging. Moreover, corporations do not just use financial derivatives, but rely heavily on pass-through, operational hedging, and foreign currency debt to manage financial risk.

Keywords: Corporate finance, risk management, exposure, foreign exchange rates, derivatives

JEL Classification: G12, G31, F40, F30

Suggested Citation

Aretz, Kevin and Bartram, Söhnke M., Corporate Hedging and Shareholder Value (March 5, 2009). Journal of Financial Research, Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 317-371, Winter 2010; WBS Finance Group Research Paper No. 116. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1354149

Kevin Aretz

Alliance Manchester Business School ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.kevin-aretz.com

Söhnke M. Bartram (Contact Author)

Warwick Business School - Department of Finance ( email )

Coventry, CV4 7AL
United Kingdom
+44 (24) 7657 4168 (Phone)
+1 425 952 1070 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/sbartram/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

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