Is a Higher Calling Enough? Incentive Compensation in the Church

40 Pages Posted: 9 Mar 2009 Last revised: 28 Feb 2010

See all articles by David Yermack

David Yermack

New York University (NYU) - Stern School of Business

Jay C. Hartzell

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Finance

Christopher A. Parsons

Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California

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Date Written: February 8, 2010

Abstract

We study the compensation and productivity of more than 2,000 Methodist ministers in a 43-year panel data set. The church appears to use pay-for-performance incentives for its clergy, as their compensation follows a sharing rule by which pastors receive approximately 3 percent of the incremental revenue from membership increases. The elasticity between ministers pay and parish size is similar to the firm size elasticity of compensation for public company CEOs. Among a range of possible performance measures, those with the greatest informativeness about pastoral effort are linked most closely to compensation.

Suggested Citation

Yermack, David and Hartzell, Jay C. and Parsons, Christopher A., Is a Higher Calling Enough? Incentive Compensation in the Church (February 8, 2010). Journal of Labor Economics, Forthcoming, NYU Working Paper No. FIN-08-015, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1354503

David Yermack (Contact Author)

New York University (NYU) - Stern School of Business ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~dyermack

Jay C. Hartzell

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Finance ( email )

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Austin, TX 78712
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HOME PAGE: http://www.mccombs.utexas.edu/faculty/jay.hartzell/

Christopher A. Parsons

Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California ( email )

3670 Trousdale Pkwy
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

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