On the Structure and Size of Executive Compensation Packages in German Prime Standard Firms (Struktur und Höhe von Vorstandsbezügen in deutschen Prime Standard Unternehmen)

Die Aktiengesellschaft, 8/2009, R156-R160

8 Pages Posted: 11 Mar 2009 Last revised: 31 Dec 2009

See all articles by Marc Steffen Rapp

Marc Steffen Rapp

University of Marburg - School of Business & Economics; University of Marburg - Marburg Centre for Institutional Economics (MACIE)

Philipp Schaller

Technische Universität München - Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies

Michael Wolff

University of Göttingen

Date Written: March 10, 2009

Abstract

We present selective results of an analysis of compensation practices in German Prime Standard firms in the period between 2005 and 2007. Four results emerge. First, analyses based on DAX30 firms lead to a biased view, since the amount as well as the structure of the executive compensation is characterized by substantial size effects. Second, despite the very positive market environment during the analysed time period, more than 50% of an average executive's remuneration is determined by the fixed salary. Third, the relevance of stock based compensation (both with respect to the prevalence as well as the relative weight) is commonly overestimated. Finally, deficits reveal concerning the transparency of reporting, with regard to performance measures to evaluate the bonus or the information shown in the fair value of stock based compensation.

Note: Downloadable document is in German.

Keywords: Executive compensation, remuneration, Germany

Suggested Citation

Rapp, Marc Steffen and Schaller, Philipp and Wolff, Michael, On the Structure and Size of Executive Compensation Packages in German Prime Standard Firms (Struktur und Höhe von Vorstandsbezügen in deutschen Prime Standard Unternehmen) (March 10, 2009). Die Aktiengesellschaft, 8/2009, R156-R160. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1356681 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1356681

Marc Steffen Rapp (Contact Author)

University of Marburg - School of Business & Economics ( email )

Am Plan 2
Marburg, D-35037
Germany

University of Marburg - Marburg Centre for Institutional Economics (MACIE) ( email )

Am Plan
Marburg, 35032
Germany

Philipp Schaller

Technische Universität München - Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies ( email )

Arcisstr. 21
Munich, 80333
Germany
+49 (0)89 289 25440 (Phone)

Michael Wolff

University of Göttingen ( email )

Platz der Göttinger Sieben 3
Göttingen, DE 37073
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.contolling.uni-goettingen.de

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