Financial Contracting: A Survey of Empirical Research and Future Directions

29 Pages Posted: 12 Mar 2009  

Michael R. Roberts

The Wharton School - University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Amir Sufi

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; NBER

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 23, 2009

Abstract

We review recent evidence and future directions for empirical research on financial contracting in the context of corporate finance. Specifically, we survey evidence pertaining to incentive conflicts, control rights, collateral, renegotiation, and interactions between financial contracts and other governance mechanisms. We also discuss directions for future research, concluding that the financial contracting approach offers a potentially fruitful perspective for empirical researchers seeking to better understand a variety of issues in corporate finance including capital structure, investment policy, payout policy, and corporate governance.

Keywords: Financial Contracting, Security Design, Control Rights, Renegotiation

JEL Classification: G3

Suggested Citation

Roberts, Michael R. and Sufi, Amir, Financial Contracting: A Survey of Empirical Research and Future Directions (February 23, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1356944 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1356944

Michael R. Roberts (Contact Author)

The Wharton School - University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

3620 Locust Walk, #2320
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States
(215) 573-9780 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~mrrobert/

Amir Sufi

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

NBER

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Paper statistics

Downloads
1,442
Rank
9,621
Abstract Views
5,152