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Contracts and Friendships

Ethan J. Leib

Fordham University School of Law

March 12, 2009

Emory Law Journal, Vol. 59, 2010

This article aims to give the relational theory of contract some new life, sharpening some of its claims against its competitors by refracting its theory of relational contracts through an analogy to friendship. In drawing the analogy between friendships and relational contracts and revealing their morphological similarities, I offer a provocative window into friendship's contractual structure - and into relational contracts' approximation of friendships. The analogy I develop in the article is poised to replace the "relational contract as marriage" model, prevalent among relationalists. The new model developed here is more honest to relational contract theory and to marriage - and helps relational contract theory produce some new insights, support old ones, and revise some of its normative agenda.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 78

Keywords: contracts, relational theory, friendship, marriage

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Date posted: March 13, 2009 ; Last revised: July 1, 2010

Suggested Citation

Leib, Ethan J., Contracts and Friendships (March 12, 2009). Emory Law Journal, Vol. 59, 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1358562

Contact Information

Ethan J. Leib (Contact Author)
Fordham University School of Law ( email )
140 West 62nd Street
New York, NY 10023
United States
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