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L'Etranger: Status, Property Rights and Investment Incentives in Cote d'Ivoire

Posted: 5 Aug 2009 Last revised: 7 Jan 2012

James E. Fenske

University of Oxford - Department of Economics

Date Written: March 12, 2009

Abstract

This study uses data from Cote d'Ivoire to investigate two related questions. First, it tests whether "outsider'' households have relatively small land holdings and less complete rights over land. It finds evidence of both these deficiencies. Second, the link between property rights and investment incentives is explored through an examination of fallow investment. "Outsiders'' fallow a smaller proportion of their land, indicating that their farms are left to regenerate for a shorter period of time. This is only partly explained by their incomplete property rights and relative land-poverty. These differences in investment patterns translate into lower yields per hectare.

Keywords: Property Rights, Investment, Land Tenure

JEL Classification: O12, Q15, D23

Suggested Citation

Fenske, James E., L'Etranger: Status, Property Rights and Investment Incentives in Cote d'Ivoire (March 12, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1358632 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1358632

James E. Fenske (Contact Author)

University of Oxford - Department of Economics ( email )

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