Regulation 1/2003 (and Beyond): Balancing Effective Enforcement and Due Process in Cross-Border Antitrust Investigations

International Antitrust Litigation - Conflict of Laws and Coordination, S. Francq, L. Idot and J. Basedow, eds., Oxford/Portland: Hart Publishing, 2012.

40 Pages Posted: 14 Mar 2009 Last revised: 30 Dec 2013

Date Written: April 15, 2010

Abstract

The exchange and the use of information within the European Competition Network is a key feature of the cooperative enforcement system established by Regulation 1/2003. So is the autonomy of Member States in designing their own national procedural framework for the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Yet, those two features necessarily affect each other: the diversity of procedural rules and standards in place at national level impinges on the circulation of evidentiary materials, while securing the benefits of the cooperative system induces procedural convergence and thus aligns the exercise of Member States’ autonomy. Such a diversity/effectiveness conundrum raises inevitable coordination issues which affect the position of parties in antitrust proceedings. This paper aims to identify those issues and to provide a consistent framework for the management of effectiveness and due process concerns in an enforcement context bound to remain diverse.

Keywords: EC competition law, antitrust enforcement, due process, European Union, choice of law, leniency

Suggested Citation

Gerard, Damien M. B., Regulation 1/2003 (and Beyond): Balancing Effective Enforcement and Due Process in Cross-Border Antitrust Investigations (April 15, 2010). International Antitrust Litigation - Conflict of Laws and Coordination, S. Francq, L. Idot and J. Basedow, eds., Oxford/Portland: Hart Publishing, 2012. . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1359310 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1359310

Damien M. B. Gerard (Contact Author)

University of Louvain - CeDIE ( email )

Place Montesquieu, 2
Louvain-la-Neuve, 1348
Belgium

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
118
rank
231,977
Abstract Views
788
PlumX Metrics
!

Under construction: SSRN citations will be offline until July when we will launch a brand new and improved citations service, check here for more details.

For more information