A Ramsey Bound on Stable Sets in Jordan Pillage Games

7 Pages Posted: 19 Mar 2009 Last revised: 4 Jun 2009

See all articles by Manfred Kerber

Manfred Kerber

University of Birmingham - School of Computer Science

Colin Rowat

University of Birmingham - Department of Economics

Date Written: May 1, 2009

Abstract

Jordan ("Pillage and property", JET 2006) defined "pillage games", a class of cooperative games whose dominance operator is represented by a `power function' satisfying coalitional and resource monotonicity axioms. In this environment, he proved that stable sets must be finite. We use graph theory to reinterpret this result, tightening the bound, highlighting the role played by resource monotonicity, and suggesting a strategy for yet tighter bounds.

Keywords: pillage, cooperative game theory, stable sets

JEL Classification: C71, P14

Suggested Citation

Kerber, Manfred and Rowat, Colin, A Ramsey Bound on Stable Sets in Jordan Pillage Games (May 1, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1359328 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1359328

Manfred Kerber

University of Birmingham - School of Computer Science ( email )

Edgbaston
Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2TT B17 0JH
United Kingdom

Colin Rowat (Contact Author)

University of Birmingham - Department of Economics ( email )

Economics Department
Birmingham, B15 2TT
United Kingdom
+44 121 414 3754 (Phone)
+44 121 414 7377 (Fax)

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