Download This PaperA Ramsey Bound on Stable Sets in Jordan Pillage Games
7 Pages Posted: 19 Mar 2009 Last revised: 4 Jun 2009
Date Written: May 1, 2009
Abstract
Jordan ("Pillage and property", JET 2006) defined "pillage games", a class of cooperative games whose dominance operator is represented by a `power function' satisfying coalitional and resource monotonicity axioms. In this environment, he proved that stable sets must be finite. We use graph theory to reinterpret this result, tightening the bound, highlighting the role played by resource monotonicity, and suggesting a strategy for yet tighter bounds.
Keywords: pillage, cooperative game theory, stable sets
JEL Classification: C71, P14
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Kerber, Manfred and Rowat, Colin, A Ramsey Bound on Stable Sets in Jordan Pillage Games (May 1, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1359328 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1359328
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