60 Pages Posted: 17 Mar 2009 Last revised: 1 Oct 2012
Date Written: April 12, 2012
We examine how the banking sector could ignite the formation of asset price bubbles when there is access to abundant liquidity. Inside banks, to induce effort, loan officers are compensated based on the volume of loans. Volume-based compensation also induces greater risk taking; however, due to lack of commitment, loan officers are penalized ex post only if banks suffer a high enough liquidity shortfall. Outside banks, when there is heightened macroeconomic risk, investors reduce direct investment and hold more bank deposits. This 'flight to quality' leaves banks flush with liquidity, lowering the sensitivity of bankers' payoffs to downside risks and inducing excessive credit volume and asset price bubbles. The seeds of a crisis are thus sown.
Keywords: Bubbles, Flight to quality, Moral hazard
JEL Classification: E32, G21
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Acharya, Viral V. and Naqvi, Hassan, The Seeds of a Crisis: A Theory of Bank Liquidity and Risk-Taking Over the Business Cycle (April 12, 2012). Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Volume 106, Issue 2, November 2012, Pages 349-366; AFA 2011 Denver Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1360974 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1360974