The Advisory Role of the Board: Evidence from the Implementation of Independent Director System in China
35 Pages Posted: 17 Mar 2009
Abstract
This paper explores the empirical results of the implementation of an independent director system in China. The results show that firms implement board independence by adding extra members, instead of removing inside directors, except in the case where the board size (before the recruitment of independent directors) has already been too large. It has been identified that large firms prefer a large board with more independent directors on the board. However, the largest shareholders have a strong incentive to organise a small and insider-controlled board. Although there is a negative relationship between board size, board independence and firm performance, Tobin's Q increases in relation to board size and board independence for large firms.
Keywords: Corporate governance; Board structure; Firm performance; China
JEL Classification: G34, G38
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you want regular updates from SSRN on Twitter?
Recommended Papers
-
From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization
-
Enterprise Restructuring in Transition: A Quantitative Survey
By Simeon Djankov and Peter Murrell
-
Enterprise Restructuring in Transition: A Quantitative Survey
By Simeon Djankov and Peter Murrell
-
Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong?
By Bernard S. Black, Reinier Kraakman, ...
-
How Does Privatization Work? Evidence from the Russian Shops
By Nicholas Barberis, Maxim Boycko, ...
-
By Joseph P. H. Fan and T.j. Wong
-
By Enrico C. Perotti and Bruno Biais