Leading With(Out) Sacrifice? A Public-Goods Experiment with a Super-Additive Player

Glöckner, Andreas; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Kube, Sebastian; Nicklisch, Andreas; Normann, Hans-Theo

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1361649

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Leading With(Out) Sacrifice? A Public-Goods Experiment with a Super-Additive Player

MPI Collective Goods Preprint, No. 2009/8

12 Pages Posted: 18 Mar 2009

See all articles by Andreas Glöckner

Andreas Glöckner

University of Cologne; Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Bernd Irlenbusch

London School of Economics & Political Science - Department of Management; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Sebastian Kube

University of Bonn; Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Andreas Nicklisch

University of Hamburg - School of Business, Economics and Social Sciences; Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Hans-Theo Normann

Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf - Department of Economics; Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Date Written: March 2009

Abstract

We analyse two team settings in which one member in a team has stronger incentives to contribute than the others. If contributions constitute a sacrifice for the strong player, the other team members are more inclined to cooperate than if contributions are strictly dominant for the strong player.

Keywords: Experiments, Leadership, Reciprocity, Voluntary Contribution Mechanism

JEL Classification: C91, C92, H40, H41

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Glöckner, Andreas and Irlenbusch, Bernd and Kube, Sebastian and Kube, Sebastian and Nicklisch, Andreas and Normann, Hans-Theo, Leading With(Out) Sacrifice? A Public-Goods Experiment with a Super-Additive Player (March 2009). MPI Collective Goods Preprint, No. 2009/8, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1361649 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1361649