The Political Imposture of Passive Capital

Journal of Corporate Law Studies, Vol. 9, p. 139, April 2009

31 Pages Posted: 19 Mar 2009 Last revised: 27 Apr 2009

Date Written: March 1, 2009

Abstract

Considerable political freight attaches to the notion that passive capital is vulnerable. Dimensions of that idea have been important in defining the contours of much corporate regulation. The endorsement or defence of the interests of passive capital, however, may be imposture. It often serves active capital to embrace the "vulnerability" of passive capital. The legal structure moulded to acknowledge and counterbalance the passivity of passive capital may be exploited to secure the incumbency and objectives of dominant coalitions. Our regulatory designs must be attentive to the potential for the passive capital elevation of active capital.

Keywords: passive shareholder, passive capital, control, corporate governance, limited liability, corporate democracy, shareholder primacy, director primacy

Suggested Citation

Flannigan, Robert, The Political Imposture of Passive Capital (March 1, 2009). Journal of Corporate Law Studies, Vol. 9, p. 139, April 2009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1362154

Robert Flannigan (Contact Author)

University of Saskatchewan ( email )

15 Campus Drive
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan S7N 5A6
Canada
306-966-5876 (Phone)
306-966-5900 (Fax)

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