Cores of Combined Games

21 Pages Posted: 19 Mar 2009

See all articles by Francis Bloch

Francis Bloch

University of Angers - Research Group in Quantitative Saving (GREQAM); National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS)

Geoffroy de Clippel

Brown University - Department of Economics

Date Written: March 18, 2009

Abstract

This paper studies the core of combined games, obtained by summing two coalitional games. It is shown that the set of balanced transferable utility games can be partitioned into equivalence classes of component games to determine whether the core of the combined game coincides with the sum of the cores of its components. On the other hand, for non-balanced games, the binary relation associating two component games whose combination has an empty core is not transitive. However, we identify a class of non-balanced games which, combined with any other non-balanced game, has an empty core.

Keywords: Cooperative Games, Core, Additivity, Issue Linkage, Multi Issue Bargaining.

JEL Classification: C70, C71

Suggested Citation

Bloch, Francis and de Clippel, Geoffrey, Cores of Combined Games (March 18, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1364252 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1364252

Francis Bloch (Contact Author)

University of Angers - Research Group in Quantitative Saving (GREQAM) ( email )

Centre de la Vieille Charité
2, rue de la Charité
Marseille, 13002
France

National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) ( email )

54, boulevard Raspail
Paris, 75006
France

Geoffrey De Clippel

Brown University - Department of Economics ( email )

64 Waterman Street
Providence, RI 02912
United States

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