The Price of a CEO's Rolodex

50 Pages Posted: 21 Mar 2009 Last revised: 30 May 2012

See all articles by Joseph Engelberg

Joseph Engelberg

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Rady School of Management

Pengjie Gao

University of Notre Dame - Mendoza College of Business

Christopher A. Parsons

Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California

Date Written: May 2012

Abstract

CEOs with large networks earn more than those with small networks. An additional connection to an executive or director outside the firm increases compensation by about $17,000 on average, more so for “important” members such as CEOs of big firms. Pay-for-connectivity is unrelated to several measures of corporate governance, evidence in favor of an efficient contracting explanation for CEO pay.

Keywords: Executive Compensation, Social Network

JEL Classification: G30

Suggested Citation

Engelberg, Joseph and Gao, Pengjie and Parsons, Christopher A., The Price of a CEO's Rolodex (May 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1364595 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1364595

Joseph Engelberg (Contact Author)

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Rady School of Management ( email )

9500 Gilman Drive
Rady School of Management
La Jolla, CA 92093
United States

Pengjie Gao

University of Notre Dame - Mendoza College of Business ( email )

246 Mendoza College of Business
Notre Dame, IN 46556-5646
United States
(574) 631-8048 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://​sites.google.com/site/gpengjie/

Christopher A. Parsons

Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California ( email )

3670 Trousdale Pkwy
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

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