The Price of a CEO's Rolodex

50 Pages Posted: 21 Mar 2009 Last revised: 30 May 2012

See all articles by Joseph Engelberg

Joseph Engelberg

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Rady School of Management

Pengjie Gao

University of Notre Dame - Mendoza College of Business

Christopher A. Parsons

Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California

Date Written: May 2012

Abstract

CEOs with large networks earn more than those with small networks. An additional connection to an executive or director outside the firm increases compensation by about $17,000 on average, more so for “important” members such as CEOs of big firms. Pay-for-connectivity is unrelated to several measures of corporate governance, evidence in favor of an efficient contracting explanation for CEO pay.

Keywords: Executive Compensation, Social Network

JEL Classification: G30

Suggested Citation

Engelberg, Joseph and Gao, Pengjie and Parsons, Christopher A., The Price of a CEO's Rolodex (May 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1364595 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1364595

Joseph Engelberg (Contact Author)

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Rady School of Management ( email )

9500 Gilman Drive
Rady School of Management
La Jolla, CA 92093
United States

Pengjie Gao

University of Notre Dame - Mendoza College of Business ( email )

246 Mendoza College of Business
Notre Dame, IN 46556-5646
United States
(574) 631-8048 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://​sites.google.com/site/gpengjie/

Christopher A. Parsons

Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California ( email )

3670 Trousdale Pkwy
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
1,017
Abstract Views
10,054
Rank
41,014
PlumX Metrics