70 Pages Posted: 21 Mar 2009 Last revised: 12 May 2014
Date Written: March 18, 2009
We investigate the competitive relationship between financial analysts and firm insiders for price-sensitive information. We identify the influence of this competition on trade dynamics by empirically examining the impact of complete analysts’ coverage termination on stocks’ liquidity, price discovery and insider trading. Termination leads to a deterioration in liquidity and price efficiency, an increase in information asymmetries, and higher profitability of insider trades. Importantly, the magnitude of these effects depends on insiders’ presence. Institutional investors alleviate, but do not eliminate, the effects of coverage termination. Overall, this evidence indicates that analysts contribute to market quality through competition with insiders.
Keywords: Sell-side research, Insiders, Insider Trading, Information Asymmetries, Liquidity
JEL Classification: D14, G24, D82
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Panayides, Marios A. and Ellul, Andrew, Do Financial Analysts Restrain Insiders' Informational Advantage? (March 18, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1364660 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1364660