Voting on Labour-Market Integration and Education Policy When Citizens Differ in Mobility and Ability

29 Pages Posted: 19 Mar 2009

See all articles by Alexander Haupt

Alexander Haupt

University of Plymouth - Plymouth Business School; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Silke Uebelmesser

University of Jena - School of Economics and Business Administration; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: March 2009

Abstract

We analyse how institutional and political decisions are intertwined. Citizens who differ in their mobility and ability vote first on labour market integration and afterwards on education policy. The institutional decision on integration influences the succeeding education policy. More surprisingly, the prospect of voting on education policy also affects the preceding integration decision. There are incentives for citizens to vote strategically for the institutional setting in which their preferred education policy is more successful at the polls. We show how a 'joint' analysis of the institutional and political decision alters the results compared to an 'isolated' analysis of either of the two decisions. Also, we explore how the two-dimensional heterogeneity of the citizens shapes the voting equilibrium in our setting with sequential voting.

Keywords: voting, labour-market integration, education policy, migration

JEL Classification: D72, F22, H52, I28

Suggested Citation

Haupt, Alexander and Uebelmesser, Silke, Voting on Labour-Market Integration and Education Policy When Citizens Differ in Mobility and Ability (March 2009). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2588. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1365151

Alexander Haupt

University of Plymouth - Plymouth Business School ( email )

Mast House
Plymouth, Devon PL4 8AA
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Silke Uebelmesser (Contact Author)

University of Jena - School of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

Carl-Zeiss-Str. 3
D-07743 Jena
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

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