Judicial Independence and the Politics of Depoliticization

37 Pages Posted: 23 Mar 2009

See all articles by Karen Eltis

Karen Eltis

University of Ottawa - Faculty of Law; Affiliate- CITP Princeton

Fabien Gelinas

McGill University

Date Written: March 21, 2009


The power and legitimacy of judges are anchored in the public's trust - the public's perception of and faith in their ability to decide impartially and disinterestedly, shielded from inappropriate external influences and political pressures. Accordingly, certain rules and understandings must be in place for the purpose of insulating the judiciary from politicization and protecting it from both the reality and the appearance of improper influence by government or disputants. These rules and understandings take multiple forms the most recognisable of which are the written provisions of the constitution, provincial and federal legislation, constitutional conventions and unwritten principle. The aim of this paper is to untangle the main strands of judicial independence as we find it in Canada, and to put the recent developments in the Supreme Court appointments process in the critical perspective of the normative uncertainties and political rhetoric surrounding change.

Keywords: Judicial Independence, Independence of the Judiciary, Separation of Power, Security of Tenure, Financial Security, Remuneration Reference, Compensation Reference, Remuneration Commission, Compensation Commission, Administrative Independence, Administrative Autonomy, Court Administra

Suggested Citation

Eltis, Karen and Gelinas, Fabien, Judicial Independence and the Politics of Depoliticization (March 21, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1366242 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1366242

Karen Eltis

University of Ottawa - Faculty of Law; Affiliate- CITP Princeton ( email )

57 Louis Pasteur Dr

Fabien Gelinas (Contact Author)

McGill University ( email )

3644 Peel Street
Montreal, Quebec H3A1W9

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
PlumX Metrics