Do Managers Value Stock Options and Restricted Stock Consistent with Economic Theory?

Posted: 26 Mar 2009

See all articles by Frank D. Hodge

Frank D. Hodge

University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business

Shivaram Rajgopal

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Accounting, Business Law & Taxation

Terry J. Shevlin

University of California-Irvine; University of California-Irvine

Date Written: March 23, 2009

Abstract

We conduct a field survey to investigate whether current mid-level and future entry-level managers (collectively managers) subjectively value stock options and restricted stock consistent with economic theory. We find that managers, on average, subjectively value stock options at greater than their Black-Scholes value and greater than fair-value equivalent restricted stock. This result contrasts with conventional economic wisdom that risk-averse employees discount the Black-Scholes value of an option. With respect to stock options, our results also reveal that managers, on average, have a lottery ticket mentality when subjectively valuing options, they value shorter vesting periods, and they value longer terms to maturity. With respect to stock options and restricted stock, we find that managers tend to extrapolate recently rising stock price trends to arrive at their subjective values. Overall, our results suggest that in some cases standard economic theory does not accurately reflect how managers appear to subjectively value stock options and restricted stock.

Keywords: Stock options, Restricted stock, Managers' subjective values, Black-Scholes model

JEL Classification: G12, J33, C93

Suggested Citation

Hodge, Frank Douglas and Rajgopal, Shivaram and Shevlin, Terry J. and Shevlin, Terry J., Do Managers Value Stock Options and Restricted Stock Consistent with Economic Theory? (March 23, 2009). Contemporary Accounting Research, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1367276

Frank Douglas Hodge

University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business ( email )

Paccar Hall 540, Box 353200
Seattle, WA 98195-3200
United States
206-616-8598 (Phone)
206-685-9392 (Fax)

Shivaram Rajgopal (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Accounting, Business Law & Taxation ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Terry J. Shevlin

University of California-Irvine ( email )

Paul Merage School of Business
Irvine, CA California 92697-3125
United States
2065509891 (Phone)

University of California-Irvine ( email )

Paul Merage School of Business
Irvine, CA 92697-3125
United States
949-824-6149 (Phone)

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