Evolution of Cooperation in Asymmetric Commons Dilemmas

12 Pages Posted: 26 Mar 2009 Last revised: 18 May 2010

See all articles by Marco A. Janssen

Marco A. Janssen

Arizona State University (ASU)

Nathan Rollins

Arizona State University (ASU)

Date Written: March 15, 2009

Abstract

Field experiments with asymmetric commons dilemmas have shown that groups who are able to derive high social efficiency also had higher equity compared to groups who were not able to derive significant levels of social efficiency. We present an agent-based model based on cultural group selection that shows that the patterns observed in the field experiments can be evolved only in cases where agents participate regularly in less challenging social dilemmas. These preliminary results indicate that cooperation in asymmetric dilemmas can only evolve and persist when the agents have social dilemmas beyond the asymmetric dilemmas.

Suggested Citation

Janssen, Marco A. and Rollins, Nathan, Evolution of Cooperation in Asymmetric Commons Dilemmas (March 15, 2009). Context and the Evolution of Mechanisms for Solving Collective Action Problems Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1368783 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1368783

Marco A. Janssen (Contact Author)

Arizona State University (ASU) ( email )

Farmer Building 440G PO Box 872011
Tempe, AZ 85287
United States

Nathan Rollins

Arizona State University (ASU) ( email )

Farmer Building 440G PO Box 872011
Tempe, AZ 85287
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
100
Abstract Views
618
rank
265,098
PlumX Metrics