Evolution of Cooperation in Asymmetric Commons Dilemmas
12 Pages Posted: 26 Mar 2009 Last revised: 18 May 2010
Date Written: March 15, 2009
Field experiments with asymmetric commons dilemmas have shown that groups who are able to derive high social efficiency also had higher equity compared to groups who were not able to derive significant levels of social efficiency. We present an agent-based model based on cultural group selection that shows that the patterns observed in the field experiments can be evolved only in cases where agents participate regularly in less challenging social dilemmas. These preliminary results indicate that cooperation in asymmetric dilemmas can only evolve and persist when the agents have social dilemmas beyond the asymmetric dilemmas.
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