Foreign Solutions for Local Problems? The Use of US-Style Fiduciary Duties to Regulate Agreed Takeovers in China
Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 407-420, November 2008
14 Pages Posted: 26 Mar 2009 Last revised: 24 Oct 2015
Date Written: November 30, 2008
Abstract
The private sale of corporate control, or agreed takeover, of listed companies has been the primary form of control transaction in China. However such takeovers have in many cases presented an opportunity for the control buyer and seller to extract value from the company at the expense of the target company's non-insider minority shareholders. One key legal development that attempts to address this issue is the imposition of US-style fiduciary duties on both incumbent and new controllers. This article argues that placing controllers under fiduciary duties has largely failed to protect the minority shareholders of Chinese listed companies from the exploitation of both the seller and buyer of corporate control. The failure is partly due to the weakness of the requisite complementary legal institutions, and partly due to the absence of a supporting social context.
Keywords: Fiduciary Duty, Corporate Control Transactions, Company Law, China
JEL Classification: D82, G28, K22, K42, P31
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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