Individuals and Teams in Auctions

Posted: 27 Mar 2009

See all articles by Matthias Sutter

Matthias Sutter

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods; University of Cologne - Department of Economics

Martin G. Kocher

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics; Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) - Department of Economics & Finance; Göteborg University - School of Business, Economics and Law; Queensland University of Technology - School of Economics and Finance

Sabine Strauß

University of Munich

Date Written: April 2009

Abstract

Experimental studies on bidding in auctions have so far relied on individual bidders, even though teams are often involved in real auctions. We examine the bidding behaviour of individuals and teams. Our experimental results show that teams stay longer in an (ascending sealed-bid English) auction and pay significantly higher prices than individuals. Consequently, teams make smaller profits and suffer more often from the winner's curse. The auction's efficiency is nevertheless higher with teams, since bidders with the highest valuation are more likely to win the auction when teams bid. We relate our findings to the European UMTS-spectrum auctions.

JEL Classification: C91, C92, D44

Suggested Citation

Sutter, Matthias and Kocher, Martin G. and Strauss, Sabine, Individuals and Teams in Auctions (April 2009). Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 61, Issue 2, pp. 380-394, 2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1369072 or http://dx.doi.org/gpn037

Matthias Sutter (Contact Author)

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

University of Cologne - Department of Economics

Cologne, 50923
Germany

Martin G. Kocher

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Ludwigstrasse 28
Munich, D-80539
Germany

Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) - Department of Economics & Finance ( email )

Stumpergasse 56
A-1060 Vienna, A-1060
Austria

Göteborg University - School of Business, Economics and Law ( email )

Vasagatan 1
Goteborg, 40530
Sweden

Queensland University of Technology - School of Economics and Finance ( email )

GPO Box 2434
2 George Street
Brisbane, Queensland 4001
Australia

Sabine Strauss

University of Munich ( email )

Poschingerstr. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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