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https://ssrn.com/abstract=1369826
 
 

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Other-Regarding Preferences and Leadership Styles


Martin G. Kocher


Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics; Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) - Department of Economics & Finance; Göteborg University - School of Business, Economics and Law; Queensland University of Technology - School of Economics and Finance

Ganna Pogrebna


Columbia University

Matthias Sutter


University of Innsbruck; University of Gothenburg - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics


IZA Discussion Paper No. 4080

Abstract:     
We use a laboratory experiment to examine whether and to what extent other-regarding preferences of team leaders influence their leadership style in choice under risk. We find that leaders who prefer efficiency or report high levels of selfishness are more likely to exercise an autocratic leadership style by ignoring preferences of the other team members. Yet, inequity aversion has no significant impact on leadership styles. Elected leaders have a higher propensity than exogenously assigned leaders to use a democratic leadership style by reaching team consensus. Male leaders and leaders influenced by group membership tend to employ a democratic leadership style.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 59

Keywords: leadership style, other-regarding preferences, unobserved heterogeneity

JEL Classification: C91, C92, D70, D81


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Date posted: March 30, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Kocher, Martin G. and Pogrebna, Ganna and Sutter, Matthias, Other-Regarding Preferences and Leadership Styles. IZA Discussion Paper No. 4080. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1369826

Contact Information

Martin G. Kocher (Contact Author)
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics ( email )
Ludwigstrasse 28
Munich, D-80539
Germany
Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) - Department of Economics & Finance ( email )
Stumpergasse 56
A-1060 Vienna, A-1060
Austria
Göteborg University - School of Business, Economics and Law ( email )
Vasagatan 1
Goteborg, 40530
Sweden
Queensland University of Technology - School of Economics and Finance ( email )
GPO Box 2434
2 George Street
Brisbane, Queensland 4001
Australia
Ganna Pogrebna
Columbia University ( email )
419 Schermerhorn Hall
New York, NY 10027
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.gannapogrebna.com
Matthias Sutter
University of Innsbruck ( email )
Universitaetsstr. 15/4
A-6020, Innsbruck
Austria
University of Gothenburg - Department of Economics ( email )
Box 640
Vasagatan 1, E-building, floor 5 & 6
Göteborg, 40530
Sweden
IZA Institute of Labor Economics
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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