Other-Regarding Preferences and Leadership Styles

59 Pages Posted: 30 Mar 2009  

Martin G. Kocher

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics; Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) - Department of Economics & Finance; Göteborg University - School of Business, Economics and Law; Queensland University of Technology - School of Economics and Finance

Ganna Pogrebna

Columbia University

Matthias Sutter

University of Innsbruck; University of Gothenburg - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Abstract

We use a laboratory experiment to examine whether and to what extent other-regarding preferences of team leaders influence their leadership style in choice under risk. We find that leaders who prefer efficiency or report high levels of selfishness are more likely to exercise an autocratic leadership style by ignoring preferences of the other team members. Yet, inequity aversion has no significant impact on leadership styles. Elected leaders have a higher propensity than exogenously assigned leaders to use a democratic leadership style by reaching team consensus. Male leaders and leaders influenced by group membership tend to employ a democratic leadership style.

Keywords: leadership style, other-regarding preferences, unobserved heterogeneity

JEL Classification: C91, C92, D70, D81

Suggested Citation

Kocher, Martin G. and Pogrebna, Ganna and Sutter, Matthias, Other-Regarding Preferences and Leadership Styles. IZA Discussion Paper No. 4080. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1369826

Martin G. Kocher (Contact Author)

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Ludwigstrasse 28
Munich, D-80539
Germany

Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) - Department of Economics & Finance ( email )

Stumpergasse 56
A-1060 Vienna, A-1060
Austria

Göteborg University - School of Business, Economics and Law ( email )

Vasagatan 1
Goteborg, 40530
Sweden

Queensland University of Technology - School of Economics and Finance ( email )

GPO Box 2434
2 George Street
Brisbane, Queensland 4001
Australia

Ganna Pogrebna

Columbia University ( email )

419 Schermerhorn Hall
New York, NY 10027
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.gannapogrebna.com

Matthias Sutter

University of Innsbruck ( email )

Universitaetsstr. 15/4
A-6020, Innsbruck
Austria

University of Gothenburg - Department of Economics ( email )

Box 640
Vasagatan 1, E-building, floor 5 & 6
Göteborg, 40530
Sweden

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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