Ambiguous Solicitation: Ambiguous Prescription

Williams College Economics Department Working Paper No. 2009-02

24 Pages Posted: 1 Apr 2009

See all articles by Robert S. Gazzale

Robert S. Gazzale

University of Toronto - Department of Economics; Williams College - Department of Economics

Julian C. Jamison

University of Exeter Business School - Department of Economics; World Bank eMBeD (Mind, Behavior, and Development); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL); Innovations for Poverty Action

Alexander Karlan

Williams College - Department of Economics

Dean S. Karlan

Yale University; Innovations for Poverty Action; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 31, 2009

Abstract

We conduct a two-phase laboratory experiment, separated by several weeks. In the first phase, we conduct urn games intended to measure ambiguity aversion on a representative population of undergraduate students. In the second phase, we invite the students back with four different solicitation treatments, varying in the ambiguity of information regarding the task and the payout of the laboratory experiment. We find that those who return do not differ from the overall pool with respect to their ambiguity version. However, no solicitation treatment generates a representative sample. The ambiguous task treatment drives away the ambiguity averse disproportionally, and the detailed task treatment draws in the ambiguity averse disproportionally.

Keywords: Laboratory experimental methods, Experimental economics, Laboratory selection effects

JEL Classification: B40, C81, C90, C91, D80, D83

Suggested Citation

Gazzale, Robert S. and Jamison, Julian C. and Karlan, Alexander and Karlan, Dean S., Ambiguous Solicitation: Ambiguous Prescription (March 31, 2009). Williams College Economics Department Working Paper No. 2009-02. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1371645 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1371645

Robert S. Gazzale (Contact Author)

University of Toronto - Department of Economics ( email )

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Julian C. Jamison

University of Exeter Business School - Department of Economics ( email )

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Alexander Karlan

Williams College - Department of Economics ( email )

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Williamstown, MA 01267
United States

Dean S. Karlan

Yale University ( email )

Box 208269
New Haven, CT 06520-8269
United States

Innovations for Poverty Action ( email )

1731 Connecticut Ave, 4th floor
New Haven, CT 20009
United States

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) ( email )

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United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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