Going-Private Decisions and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A Cross-Country Analysis

Posted: 13 Apr 2009

See all articles by Ehud Kamar

Ehud Kamar

Tel Aviv University - Buchmann Faculty of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Pinar Karaca-Mandic

RAND Corporation

Eric L. Talley

Columbia University - School of Law

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 2009

Abstract

This article investigates whether the passage and the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) drove firms out of the public capital market. To control for other factors affecting exit decisions, we examine the post-SOX change in the propensity of American public targets to be bought by private acquirers rather than public ones with the corresponding change for foreign public targets, which were outside the purview of SOX. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that SOX induced small firms to exit the public capital market during the year following its enactment. In contrast, SOX appears to have had little effect on the going-private propensities of larger firms. (JEL G30, G34, G38, K22)

Suggested Citation

Kamar, Ehud and Karaca-Mandic, Pinar and Talley, Eric L., Going-Private Decisions and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A Cross-Country Analysis (May 2009). The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 25, Issue 1, pp. 107-133, 2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1372582 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewn019

Ehud Kamar (Contact Author)

Tel Aviv University - Buchmann Faculty of Law ( email )

Ramat Aviv
Tel Aviv 69978, IL
Israel
972-3-6407301 (Phone)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

Pinar Karaca-Mandic

RAND Corporation ( email )

1776 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA 90407
United States

Eric L. Talley

Columbia University - School of Law ( email )

435 West 116th Street
New York, NY 10025
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.erictalley.com

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