The Irony of Deregulatory Takings

24 Pages Posted: 31 Oct 1998

See all articles by Jim Rossi

Jim Rossi

Vanderbilt University - Law School

Abstract

This is a critical review essay, exploring the thesis advanced by Gregory Sidak and Daniel Spulber in their book Deregulatory Takings and the Regulatory Contract (Cambridge University Press 1997). Sidak and Spulber argue that deregulation of the electric utility and local telephony industries can constitute an unconstitutional taking to the extent the state does not provide compensation for the investment-backed expectations of firms in the industry. In addition, they argue that economic efficiency requires this result. This review takes Sidak and Spulber to task for their reading of the case law. In addition, the review criticizes their argument for giving short shrift to the lessons of public choice theory and the law and economics of risk. In many instances, it is argued, private industry is in a better position than ratepayers or government to bear the risk of regulatory change in the utility industry. Thus shared responsibility for change to the industry is appropriate.

Keywords: Constitutional takings, Networks, Deregulation, Energy, Telecommunications

Suggested Citation

Rossi, Jim, The Irony of Deregulatory Takings. Texas Law Review, Vol. 77, pp. 297-320, 1998 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=137438 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.137438

Jim Rossi (Contact Author)

Vanderbilt University - Law School ( email )

131 21st Ave S
Nashville, TN 37203-5724
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