Water Markets as a Tragedy of the Anticommons

William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review, Vol. 33

66 Pages Posted: 9 Apr 2009 Last revised: 3 May 2014

See all articles by Stephen Norris Bretsen

Stephen Norris Bretsen

Wheaton College

Peter J. Hill

Wheaton College; PERC - Property and Environment Research Center

Date Written: April 8, 2009

Abstract

In much of the American West water shortages are becoming an important concern. With increasing demands for water for municipal, industrial, and environmental uses, transfers of water from the currently predominant agricultural uses to these other uses should produce economic gains. Even though most commodity markets respond rapidly to price differentials and reduce those differentials over time, water transfers out of agriculture into higher value uses are not occurring very rapidly. The existence of multiple rights of exclusion unbundled from the rights of use under the prior appropriation doctrine in the American West creates an anticommons that has impeded water transactions. This article explains the tragedy of the anticommons, describes the various rights of exclusion that create an anticommons in western water markets, and concludes with case studies that illustrate the difficulty of water transfers.

Keywords: water markets, anticommons

JEL Classification: N50, Q30, Q38, Q25, R38

Suggested Citation

Bretsen, Stephen Norris and Hill, Peter J., Water Markets as a Tragedy of the Anticommons (April 8, 2009). William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review, Vol. 33. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1375164

Stephen Norris Bretsen

Wheaton College ( email )

501 College Ave
Wheaton, IL 60187
United States

Peter J. Hill (Contact Author)

Wheaton College ( email )

501 College Ave.
Wheaton, IL 60187
United States

PERC - Property and Environment Research Center

2048 Analysis Drive
Suite A
Bozeman, MT 59718
United States

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