Patent Quality and the 'Public Notice' Function of Patent Rights

31 Pages Posted: 9 Apr 2009 Last revised: 5 Dec 2014

See all articles by Jing-Yuan Chiou

Jing-Yuan Chiou

IMT Institute for Advanced Studies

Date Written: October 1, 2012

Abstract

A patent fails to deliver public notice when it informs little about the patent boundary decision of the court. High quality of patent examination, i.e, less mistakes committed by the patent office, improves public notice. This paper provides a framework of evaluating the benefit of public notice to facilitate private investments, and how this information value is affected by strategic investments, market structure, and the accumulation of patent rights.

Keywords: Convex Ordering, Fuzzy Patents, Public Notice

JEL Classification: K40, O33, O34

Suggested Citation

Chiou, Jing-Yuan, Patent Quality and the 'Public Notice' Function of Patent Rights (October 1, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1375363 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1375363

Jing-Yuan Chiou (Contact Author)

IMT Institute for Advanced Studies ( email )

Complesso San Micheletto
Lucca, 55100
Italy
+39 0583 4326 734 (Phone)

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