Download This PaperPatent Quality and the 'Public Notice' Function of Patent Rights
31 Pages Posted: 9 Apr 2009 Last revised: 5 Dec 2014
Date Written: October 1, 2012
Abstract
A patent fails to deliver public notice when it informs little about the patent boundary decision of the court. High quality of patent examination, i.e, less mistakes committed by the patent office, improves public notice. This paper provides a framework of evaluating the benefit of public notice to facilitate private investments, and how this information value is affected by strategic investments, market structure, and the accumulation of patent rights.
Keywords: Convex Ordering, Fuzzy Patents, Public Notice
JEL Classification: K40, O33, O34
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Chiou, Jing-Yuan, Patent Quality and the 'Public Notice' Function of Patent Rights (October 1, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1375363 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1375363
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