Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=1375460
 
 

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Information Security Expenditures and Real Options: A Wait-and-See Approach


Lawrence A. Gordon


University of Maryland - Department of Accounting & Information Assurance

Martin P. Loeb


University of Maryland - Robert H. Smith School of Business

William Lucyshyn


University of Maryland - Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise

May 31, 2003

Computer Security Journal, Vol. XIX, No. 2, Spring, 2003

Abstract:     
This paper examines the deferment option explanation for why information security breaches are so prevalent. Our examination will focus on security breaches within major U.S. corporations and will include some empirical evidence to support our discussion. As will be seen, the evidence presented supports the argument that the ubiquitous nature of security breaches is due, at least in part, to the wait-and-see (i.e., deferment option) approach of many senior managers. This article will also show why such an approach is quite rational from an economics perspective.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 16

Keywords: Information Security, Real Options


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Date posted: May 31, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Gordon, Lawrence A. and Loeb, Martin P. and Lucyshyn, William, Information Security Expenditures and Real Options: A Wait-and-See Approach (May 31, 2003). Computer Security Journal, Vol. XIX, No. 2, Spring, 2003. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1375460

Contact Information

Lawrence A. Gordon
University of Maryland - Department of Accounting & Information Assurance ( email )
Robert H. Smith School of Business
College Park, MD 20742-9157
United States
Martin P. Loeb
University of Maryland - Robert H. Smith School of Business ( email )
Robert H. Smith School of Business
College Park, MD 20742-1815
United States
301-405-2209 (Phone)
301-314-9157 (Fax)
William Lucyshyn (Contact Author)
University of Maryland - Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise ( email )
College Park, MD 20742-1815
United States
301 405-8257 (Phone)
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