Trade Policy and Mixed Enterprises

25 Pages Posted: 27 Apr 2009

See all articles by Ngo Van Long

Ngo Van Long

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Frank Stähler

University of Tuebingen - Department of Economics; University of Adelaide - School of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Abstract

This paper demonstrates that the degree of state ownership affects neither the level of socially optimal activities nor welfare if the government chooses optimal trade policy instruments. In the case of rivalry in the home market, the optimal import tariff is independent of the degree of state ownership, and the optimal production subsidy decreases with state ownership if the optimal tariff is positive. For the case of Cournot rivalry in a third market, the optimal export subsidy increases with state ownership, while in the case of Bertrand rivalry with differentiated products, the optimal export tax increases with state ownership.

Suggested Citation

Van Long, Ngo and Stähler, Frank, Trade Policy and Mixed Enterprises. Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 42, Issue 2, pp. 590-614, May 2009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1375905 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5982.2009.01520.x

Ngo Van Long (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

Frank Stähler

University of Tuebingen - Department of Economics ( email )

Mohlstrasse 36
D-72074 Tuebingen, 72074
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.frank-staehler.de

University of Adelaide - School of Economics ( email )

Adelaide SA, 5005
Australia

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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