Bidding Behaviour in Multi-Unit Auctions an Experimental Investigation
28 Pages Posted: 27 Apr 2009
Abstract
We present laboratory experiments of five different multi-unit auction mechanisms. Two units of a homogeneous object were auctioned off among two bidders with flat demand for two units. We test whether expected demand reduction occurs in open and sealed-bid uniform-price auctions. We also test revenue equivalence for these auctions as well as for the Ausubel, the Vickrey and the discriminatory sealed-bid auction. Furthermore, we compare the five mechanisms with respect to the efficient allocation of the units.
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Bidding Behaviour in Multi-Unit Auctions an Experimental Investigation
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