Bidding Behaviour in Multi-Unit Auctions an Experimental Investigation

28 Pages Posted: 27 Apr 2009

See all articles by Dirk Engelmann

Dirk Engelmann

University of London - Royal Holloway - Department of Economics

Veronika Grimm

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Abstract

We present laboratory experiments of five different multi-unit auction mechanisms. Two units of a homogeneous object were auctioned off among two bidders with flat demand for two units. We test whether expected demand reduction occurs in open and sealed-bid uniform-price auctions. We also test revenue equivalence for these auctions as well as for the Ausubel, the Vickrey and the discriminatory sealed-bid auction. Furthermore, we compare the five mechanisms with respect to the efficient allocation of the units.

Suggested Citation

Engelmann, Dirk and Grimm, Veronika, Bidding Behaviour in Multi-Unit Auctions an Experimental Investigation. The Economic Journal, Vol. 119, No. 537, pp. 855-882, April 2009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1376014 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02249.x

Dirk Engelmann (Contact Author)

University of London - Royal Holloway - Department of Economics ( email )

Egham, TW20 0EX
United Kingdom

Veronika Grimm

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
1
Abstract Views
279
PlumX Metrics