On Smiles, Winks and Handshakes as Coordination Devices

29 Pages Posted: 27 Apr 2009

See all articles by Paola Manzini

Paola Manzini

University of St. Andrews - School of Economics and Finance; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Abdolkarim Sadrieh

University of Magdeburg

Nicolaas J. Vriend

Queen Mary, University of London - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Abstract

In an experimental study we examine a variant of the minimum effort game, a coordination game with Pareto ranked equilibria and risk considerations pointing to the least efficient equilibrium. We focus on the question whether simple cues such as smiles, winks and handshakes could be recognised and employed by the players as a tell-tale sign of each other's trustworthiness, thus enabling them to coordinate on the more risky but more rewarding Pareto efficient equilibrium. Our experimental results show that such cues may indeed play a role as coordination devices as their information value is significant and substantial.

Suggested Citation

Manzini, Paola and Sadrieh, Abdolkarim and Vriend, Nicolaas J., On Smiles, Winks and Handshakes as Coordination Devices. The Economic Journal, Vol. 119, No. 537, pp. 826-854, April 2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1376018 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02253.x

Paola Manzini (Contact Author)

University of St. Andrews - School of Economics and Finance ( email )

North St
Saint Andrews, Fife KY16 9AJ
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~pm210/

Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Abdolkarim Sadrieh

University of Magdeburg ( email )

Faculty of Economics and Management
Postbox 4120
39016 Magdeburg
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.ww.uni-magdeburg.de

Nicolaas J. Vriend

Queen Mary, University of London - Department of Economics ( email )

Mile End Road
London, E1 4NS
United Kingdom
+44 (0)20 7882 5096 (Phone)
+44 (0)20 8983-3580 (Fax)

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
1
Abstract Views
398
PlumX Metrics