A Model of Constitutional Design and Corruption

Posted: 10 Apr 2009 Last revised: 3 Jul 2015

See all articles by Theodore Pelagidis

Theodore Pelagidis

University of Piraeus; Brookings Institution

Michael S. Mitsopoulos

Hellenic Federation of Enterprises

Date Written: April 10, 2009


We examine how some attributes of proportional democracies lead both to policy decisions that ensure a higher congruence with the preferences of the electorate, which reduces incentives to seek corrupt practices, and at the same time introduce more accountability, which further discourages corrupt practices. Our theoretical setup verifies the intuitive suggestion that proportional political systems can lead to lower corruption, but this result depends on a number of strong assumptions regarding the design of the details of these systems. This suggests that empirical evidence according to which proportional systems are more corrupt may actually document failings regarding the design of these details in proportional systems.

Keywords: Constitutions, Corruption

JEL Classification: D02 , D72 , D73

Suggested Citation

Pelagidis, Theodore and Mitsopoulos, Michael S., A Model of Constitutional Design and Corruption (April 10, 2009). European Journal of Law and Economics, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1376318

Theodore Pelagidis

University of Piraeus ( email )

21 Lambraki street
Piraeus, Attiki 18533
+3021 04142526 (Phone)
+3021 4142571 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.maritime-studies.gr/index.php?option=com_comprofiler&task=userProfile&user=95&Itemid=183

Brookings Institution ( email )

1775 Massachusetts Ave, NW
Washington, DC 20036
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.brookings.edu/experts/pelagidist

Michael S. Mitsopoulos (Contact Author)

Hellenic Federation of Enterprises ( email )

Xenofontos str 5
Athens, 10557
2106722694 (Phone)

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