The Takeover Directive: Is a Little Regulation Better than No Regulation?

24 Pages Posted: 27 Apr 2009

See all articles by Blanaid J. Clarke

Blanaid J. Clarke

Trinity College Dublin - School of Law

Abstract

This article examines Directive 2004/25/EC on Takeover Bids through a regulatory lens in order to determine its effectiveness as a regulatory mechanism. A central regulatory problem for European legislators is to determine the optimal balance between harmonisation and diversity, and the directive reflects the balance which was struck. The article questions whether the resulting light regulatory touch may have jeopardised the existing efficient self-regulatory regime which operates in the UK (the largest European takeover market), while simultaneously undermining the directive's goal of facilitating takeovers and yielding a level playing field.

Suggested Citation

Clarke, Blanaid J., The Takeover Directive: Is a Little Regulation Better than No Regulation?. European Law Journal, Vol. 15, Issue 2, pp. 174-197, March 2009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1376575 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0386.2008.00457.x

Blanaid J. Clarke (Contact Author)

Trinity College Dublin - School of Law ( email )

House 39, New Square
Dublin 2
Ireland
Ph 00353 (0)18961632 (Phone)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
4
Abstract Views
1,353
PlumX Metrics