Social Contracts on Social Networks: Local Patterns of Interaction, Local Strategy Dynamics and the Emergence of Reciprocity

27 Pages Posted: 28 Apr 2009 Last revised: 18 May 2010

See all articles by Gregory Todd Jones

Gregory Todd Jones

University of Georgia - Terry College of Business; Georgia State University - Consortium on Negotiation and Conflict Resolution; Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Sarah F. Brosnan

Georgia State University

Date Written: April 15, 2009

Abstract

Cooperation has been vital to the evolution of all living things, including single-celled organisms (Velicer, 2005, 2003; Velicer and Stredwick, 2002; Crespi, 2001; Velicer et al., 2000; Boorman and Levitt, 1980), fish (Brosnan et al., 2003; Dugatkin, 1991, 1992, 1997; Milinski, 1987), birds (Brown and Brown, 1996; Faaborg et al., 1995), canines (Creel and Creel, 2002; Courchamp and Macdonald, 2001; Fentress and Ryon, 1986), felines (Caro, 1994; Packer and Pusey, 1982), non-human primates (Brosnan and de Waal, 2003; de Waal, 1996, 1982; Harcourt and de Waal, 1992; Chapais, 1992), and humans (Ostrom et al., 1999; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Johnson et al., 2003).

Even so, the evolution of cooperative, prosocial behavior under circumstances in which individual interests are at odds with common interests, (circumstances characterized as social dilemmas (Gotts et al., 2003; Dawes and Messick, 2000)), remains a largely unsolved, multidisciplinary puzzle (Hammerstein, 2003). Approaches to these types of problems have, for the most part, been applications of evolutionary game theory (Gintis, 2000; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Maynard-Smith, 1982; Maynard-Smith and Price, 1973; Trivers, 1971; Hamilton, 1967; von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) and due to their importance as generalized models of many important socio-economic situations (Tomassini, 2006), iconic games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma have been widely employed as metaphors (Doebeli and Hauert, 2005; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Axelrod, 1984; Nowak and Sigmund, 1992, 2004; Nowak and May, 1992; Maynard-Smith, 1982; Sugden, 1986).

Suggested Citation

Jones, Gregory Todd and Brosnan, Sarah F., Social Contracts on Social Networks: Local Patterns of Interaction, Local Strategy Dynamics and the Emergence of Reciprocity (April 15, 2009). Context and the Evolution of Mechanisms for Solving Collective Action Problems Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1376804 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1376804

Gregory Todd Jones (Contact Author)

University of Georgia - Terry College of Business ( email )

Brooks Hall
Athens, GA 30602-6254
United States

Georgia State University - Consortium on Negotiation and Conflict Resolution ( email )

PO Box 4037
Atlanta, GA 30302-4037
United States

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

Sarah F. Brosnan

Georgia State University ( email )

Atlanta, GA 30303
United States
4044136301 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www2.gsu.edu/~wwwcbs/

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