Sequential versus Simultaneous Contributions to Public Goods: Experimental Evidence

39 Pages Posted: 14 Apr 2009

See all articles by Simon Gaechter

Simon Gaechter

University of Nottingham; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Daniele Nosenzo

University of Nottingham

Elke Renner

University of Nottingham

Martin Sefton

University of Nottingham - School of Economics

Date Written: April 2009

Abstract

We report an experiment comparing sequential and simultaneous contributions to a public good in a quasi-linear two-person setting (Varian, Journal of Public Economics, 1994). Our findings support the theoretical argument that sequential contributions result in lower overall provision than simultaneous contributions. However, the distribution of contributions is not as predicted: late contributors are sometimes willing to punish early low contributors by contributing less than their best response. This induces early contributors to contribute more than they otherwise would. A consequence of this is that we fail to observe a predicted first mover advantage.

Keywords: public goods, voluntary contributions, sequential moves, experiment

JEL Classification: C92, D03, H41

Suggested Citation

Gachter, Simon and Nosenzo, Daniele and Renner, Elke and Sefton, Martin, Sequential versus Simultaneous Contributions to Public Goods: Experimental Evidence (April 2009). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2602, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1379112 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1379112

Simon Gachter

University of Nottingham ( email )

University Park
Nottingham, NG8 1BB
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Daniele Nosenzo

University of Nottingham ( email )

University Park
Nottingham, NG8 1BB
United Kingdom

Elke Renner

University of Nottingham ( email )

University Park
Nottingham, NG8 1BB
United Kingdom

Martin Sefton (Contact Author)

University of Nottingham - School of Economics ( email )

University Park
Nottingham, NG7 2RD
United Kingdom

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