Characterizations of the Egalitarian Solution for Convex Games

Tilburg University, CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 1998-33

Posted: 2 Dec 1998

See all articles by Flip Klijn

Flip Klijn

Autonomous University of Barcelona - Department of Economics and Economic History

Marco Slikker

Eindhoven University of Technology (TUE) - School of Industrial Engineering

Stef H. Tijs

Tilburg University - Center For Economic Research; Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research; Università degli Studi di Genova - Dipartimento di Matematica

Date Written: 1998

Abstract

The egalitarian solution for TU-games as introduced by Dutta and Ray [3] is studied. Two characterizations of the restriction of this solution to the class of convex games are given, using weak variants of the reduced game properties of Hart and Mas-Colell [6] and Davis and Maschler [5]. The other properties are a stability property, inspired by Selten [8], and a property restricting maximum payoffs. Further, a dual egalitarian solution is introduced and it is proved that for a convex game the egalitarian allocation is equal to the dual egalitarian llocation for its dual concave game.

JEL Classification: C71

Suggested Citation

Klijn, Flip and Slikker, Marco and Tijs, Stef H., Characterizations of the Egalitarian Solution for Convex Games (1998). Tilburg University, CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 1998-33, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=138076

Flip Klijn (Contact Author)

Autonomous University of Barcelona - Department of Economics and Economic History ( email )

Edifici B - Campus Bellaterra
Barcelona, 08193
Spain

Marco Slikker

Eindhoven University of Technology (TUE) - School of Industrial Engineering ( email )

P.O. Box 513
5600 MB Eindhoven
Netherlands

Stef H. Tijs

Tilburg University - Center For Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
B925
5000 LE Tilburg
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2348 (Phone)

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research ( email )

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Università degli Studi di Genova - Dipartimento di Matematica

Via Dodecaneso 35
16146 Genoa
Italy

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