Exclusivity in Network Industries

Posted: 8 Dec 1998

See all articles by Carl Shapiro

Carl Shapiro

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business

Date Written: October 1998

Abstract

Exclusivity provisions, exclusive dealing provisions, and exclusive membership rules can create formidable entry barriers when employed by dominant incumbent networks. Exclusivity rules can restrict consumer choice and stifle innovation by denying would-be entrants the ability to gain critical mass, and by undermining consumer confidence in an emerging network. Exclusive membership rules can be especially pernicious in network industries by creating artificial entry barriers that operate on top of naturally occurring entry barriers based on consumer adoption costs, switching costs, and especially consumer coordination costs. These costs are elevated if the new network is incompatible with the established network, as may be required to avoid infringing on the intellectual property rights of the established network. Exclusivity rules are contrasted with a refusal by the incumbent network to permit the new network to interconnect and/or offer backward compatibility.

Note: This paper was presented at the George Mason Law School Antitrust Symposium.

JEL Classification: L12, L96, K23

Suggested Citation

Shapiro, Carl, Exclusivity in Network Industries (October 1998). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=138334

Carl Shapiro (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business ( email )

545 Student Services Building, #1900
2220 Piedmont Avenue
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-5905 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu

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