Cross-Selling Lending and Underwriting: Scope Economies and Incentives

Posted: 21 Apr 2009

See all articles by Christian Laux

Christian Laux

Vienna University of Economics and Business; Vienna Graduate School of Finance (VGSF); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Uwe Walz

Goethe University Frankfurt - Institute of Economics; Center For Financial Studies (CFS); Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE

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Date Written: April 2009

Abstract

We highlight the implications of combining underwriting services and lending for the choice of underwriters and for competition in the underwriting business. We show that cross-selling can increase underwriters' incentives, and we explain three phenomena: first, that cross-selling is important for universal banks to enter the investment banking business; second, that cross-selling is particularly attractive for highly leveraged borrowers; third, that less-than-market rates are no prerequisite for cross-selling to benefit a bank's clients. In our model, cross-selling reduces rents in the underwriting business.

Keywords: G21, G24, D49

Suggested Citation

Laux, Christian and Walz, Uwe, Cross-Selling Lending and Underwriting: Scope Economies and Incentives (April 2009). Review of Finance, Vol. 13, Issue 2, pp. 341-367, 2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1389154 or http://dx.doi.org/rfn027

Christian Laux

Vienna University of Economics and Business ( email )

Welthandelsplatz 1
Vienna, Wien 1020
Austria

Vienna Graduate School of Finance (VGSF) ( email )

Welthandelsplatz 1
Vienna, 1020
Austria

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Uwe Walz

Goethe University Frankfurt - Institute of Economics ( email )

Postfach 81
D-60054 Frankfurt
Germany

Center For Financial Studies (CFS) ( email )

Grüneburgplatz 1
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE ( email )

(http://www.safe-frankfurt.de)
Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

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