Strategy-Proofness Versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match
42 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2009 Last revised: 14 Aug 2010
Date Written: April 2009
The design of the New York City (NYC) High School match involved tradeoffs among efficiency, stability and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences--ties--in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the theory favor breaking indifferences the same way at every school --single tie breaking-- in a student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. Any inefficiency associated with a realized tie breaking cannot be removed without harming student incentives. Finally, we empirically document the extent of potential efficiency loss associated with strategy-proofness and stability, and direct attention to some open questions.
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