Strategy-Proofness Versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match

42 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2009 Last revised: 14 Aug 2010

See all articles by Atila Abdulkadiroglu

Atila Abdulkadiroglu

Duke University - Department of Economics

Parag A. Pathak

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics

Alvin E. Roth

HBS Negotiations, Organizations and Markets Unit; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: April 2009

Abstract

The design of the New York City (NYC) High School match involved tradeoffs among efficiency, stability and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences--ties--in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the theory favor breaking indifferences the same way at every school --single tie breaking-- in a student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. Any inefficiency associated with a realized tie breaking cannot be removed without harming student incentives. Finally, we empirically document the extent of potential efficiency loss associated with strategy-proofness and stability, and direct attention to some open questions.

Suggested Citation

Abdulkadiroglu, Atila and Pathak, Parag A. and Roth, Alvin E., Strategy-Proofness Versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match (April 2009). NBER Working Paper No. w14864. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1391822

Atila Abdulkadiroglu (Contact Author)

Duke University - Department of Economics ( email )

213 Social Sciences Building
Box 90097
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States

Parag A. Pathak

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics ( email )

50 Memorial Drive
E52-391
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States

Alvin E. Roth

HBS Negotiations, Organizations and Markets Unit ( email )

Soldiers Field
Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-495-5447 (Phone)
617-496-7379 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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