Ricardo Meets China, India and U.S. Three Hundred Years Later

36 Pages Posted: 24 Apr 2009

See all articles by Yochanan Shachmurove

Yochanan Shachmurove

City University of New York, CUNY City College of New York - Department of Economics; The University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Uriel Spiegel

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Management

Date Written: March 3, 2009

Abstract

As our trading world becomes more globalized, who benefits and who gets hurt? This paper relies on the Ricardian model to explore the effects of technological improvements in underdeveloped countries on the welfare of developed countries. For example, trading between the United States and China, which has undergone a technological improvement in commodities which China imports and exports, may lead to different welfare implications for both countries. The paper models several scenarios to indicate and demonstrate the arguments for and against globalization. The findings suggest that certain policies should be implemented to maintain and enhance the competitiveness of developed countries.

Keywords: International trade; Ricardian Model; Samuelson; Gainers and losers from trade; East-West trade; North-South trade; China; India; United States; Outsourcing

JEL Classification: F0, F1, O, O1, O3, D51

Suggested Citation

Shachmurove, Yochanan and Spiegel, Uriel, Ricardo Meets China, India and U.S. Three Hundred Years Later (March 3, 2009). PIER Working Paper No. 09-015. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1392282 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1392282

Yochanan Shachmurove (Contact Author)

City University of New York, CUNY City College of New York - Department of Economics ( email )

160 Convent Avenue
New York, NY 10031
United States
212-650-6202 (Phone)

The University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States
215-898-1090 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)

Uriel Spiegel

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Management ( email )

Ramat-Gan, 52900
Israel
011-972-3-5318282 (Phone)
+972.3.535.3329 (Fax)

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